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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1972 TERM
APPELLATE REviEw UNDER THE EXPEDMnNG AcT
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States
Section 2 of the Expediting Act vests sole appellate jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court over final judgments in civil antitrust cases ini-
tiated by the government.1 When the Expediting Act was passed in
1903, it was designed to accelerate antitrust litigation.2 Unfortunately,
as evidenced by International Business Machines Corp. v. United
States,3 this goal has not been achieved.
Despite the Government's filing of the original complaint in IBM
on January 17, 1969, a resolution of the merits has not yet been
reached. The lack of progress is partially attributable to IBM's deter-
mination to obtain appellate review of a pretrial order and the inability
of the Expediting Act to cope with this effort. In a private antitrust
suit against IBM, brought by Control Data Corporation (CDC) and
others in the federal district court in Minnesota, some 17 million
documents had been ordered produced. 4 While their transmission to
CDC was in progress, the Government, too, was engaged in discovery
with respect to an action against IBM in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Apparently impressed with the speed
of the Minnesota program, the Government chose to abandon its inde-
pendent discovery program and instead participate in the IBM-CDC
exchange.3
Due to the unusual volume of material in issue,6 IBM was con-
cerned that certain privileged documents would fall into the Govern-
ment's hands. Therefore, it was agreed that IBM would first excise
any privileged matter from the microfilms already delivered to CDC
and provide the Government with limited information concerning the
edited documents.7 To protect the heretofore unreleased material,
1 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970) provides:
In every civil action brought in any district court of the United States under
any of said [antitrust] acts, wherein the United States is complainant, an appeal
from the final judgment of the district court will lie only to the Supreme Court.
2 See Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 154-56 (1972).
3 471 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1972) (2-1), rev'd on rehearing, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973)
(en banc) (4-2).
4480 F.2d at 295.
5471 F.2d at 510.
6Judge Mulligan found it "mind-boggling to contemplate 17 million document
pages which in bulk weigh 87 tons and would stretch from coast to coast." 471 F.2d at
523 (dissenting opinion).
7 The Government was supplied with a list showing the author, addresses, nature
of the privilege, date, and file source of the documents edited from the microfilm. Most
of the documents daimed to be privileged were of an attorney-client nature. 471 F.2d at
509.
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IBM placed an "interceptOr" at the point of microfilming to insure
that no privileged matter was copied. Judge Neville of the District
Court of Minnesota, concerned about delay, ordered the "interceptor"
removed on condition that he "would thereafter brook no argument
that the privilege had been waived [by IBM] merely because the docu-
ment had been seen by CDC and perhaps copied.""
The Government moved in its own civil suit in the Southern
District of New York for the production of the documents withheld by
IBM claiming that delivery of the matter to CDC constituted a waiver
of the attorney-client privilege. 9 Chief judge Edelstein agreed and
ordered IBM to release the documents.' 0 Notwithstanding the bar of
the Expediting Act, IBM appealed from the order and petitioned for
a writ of mandamus before the Second Circuit.
A divided panel of the circuit, per Judge Moore, expressed dis-
satisfaction with the limitations on appellate review imposed by the
Act and asserted jurisdiction over the appeal from the discovery
order." In departing from precedent,12 the panel held that review was
available either by appeal or by writ and reversed the district court's
order. The panel was persuaded by IBM's contention that release of the
documents pursuant to a "no waiver" agreement could not later be
used to establish a waiver.'"
Judge Mulligan dissented, challenging the existence of the al-
leged "no waiver" agreement.14 In addition, his reading of the record
8 Order re Claimed Waiver of Privilege, Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 3-68 Civ. 312
at 2-3 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 1972), cited in 471 F.2d at 510 n.6.
9 The substantive problem in the question of the waiver of privilege related to
whether inadvertent or accidental disclosure to CDC was a waiver of the privilege for all
purposes. The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence would support IBM's claim of non-
waiver. Inadvertence or accident apparently should not constitute "voluntary disclosure."
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the
confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if he or his predecessor
while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any
significant part of the matter or communication. This rule does not apply if the
disclosure is itself a privileged communication.
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 511, 56 F.R.D. 188, 258 (Nov. 20, 1972), The
Advisory Committee's notes explain that "[b]y traditional doctrine, waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right." Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
10 Pretrial Order No. 5 (Sept. 26, 1972), as cited in 480 F.2d at 294. Chief Judge
Edelstein did not write an opinion in granting the Government's motion.
11471 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1972).
12 Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151 (1972); United States v. California
Cooperative Canneries, 279 U.S. 553 (1929). The Tidewater opinion was handed down on
December 6, 1972, thirteen days prior to the panel's decision. See notes 31-36 and
accompanying text infra.
1a 471 F.2d at 511. But see id. at 521 (Mulligan, J,, dissenting).
14471 F.2d at 523 (Mulligan, J., dissenting):
The agreement is claimed to be based on telephone calls between respective
counsel in December 1970, which culminated in a letter from IBM counsel to
counsel for the United States Department of Justice on December 28, 1970 to the
[Vol. 48:229
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convinced him that Judge Neville's assurance that he would "brook no
argument" concerning waiver, was given after the "documents had
already been made available to CDC."'15
In view of the effect the panel's ruling would have on future anti-
trust litigation the Second Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc.'6 The
en banc court reversed the panel's decision. In so doing it reaffirmed
the more traditional approach and held that the Expediting Act de-
prived the court of jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory order
either by mandamus or appeal. Judge Mulligan's dissent in the panel
decision became the basis for the en banc majority's opinion which
he authored. A subsequent attempt to obtain Supreme Court consid-
eration was unsuccessful.17
Despite its inability to establish appellate jurisdiction, IBM re-
mained determined to oppose the discovery order. Accordingly, rather
than produce the documents in accordance with the en banc opinion,
IBM respectfully refused to obey the district court's order. The refusal
resulted in a civil contempt citation and a $150,000 a day fine which
effect that the sense of their undertaking was that IBM would only deliver a
copy of the microfilm taken by CDC with the excision of any inadvertently
produced privileged documents. Since this letter was not answered, it is obvious
that the Government elected this option and refused an alternative suggestion
that the entire and unedited microfilm be supplied with the Government stipulat-
ing that IBM had not waived its privilege. The parties now draw conflicting
inferences from the alternative selection made by the Government.
15 Id. at 522:
The record does not warrant the assumption that IBM withdrew its interceptor
only because of Judge Neville's assurance that he would "brook no argument"
thereafter that the privilege had been waived merely because the document had
been seen by CDC and perhaps copied. That assurance was only forthcoming in
his order of April 18, 1972 on the motion of IBM which order was made some
11 days after the motion of the United States in the Southern District of New
York to compel disclosure of the 1200 questioned documents. It would seem
reasonable to assume that all of these documents had already been made available
to CDC prior to this determination.
16 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc). Judge Timbers in his dissent expressed his
continuing concern over the method in which current en bane procedures are permitted
to operate. In the present case only five members of the nine-man court were eligible to
vote for the rehearing; three had disqualified themselves from voting on all phases of
the case and there has been a vacancy on the bench for over a year and a half. Without
Judge Timbers' vote, the five votes required by 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970) would not have
been obtainable. According to Judge Timbers:
lI]t is of less importance that the vote of a single active judge could have blocked
en bane reconsideration than that each active judge was willing to vote in favor
of en bane, thus assuring that the will of the other four.., was not thwarted.
Id. at 805 (dissenting opinion). Judge Timbers had previously expressed concern over
the operation of the procedure in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.
1972) (en bane denied where 4 in favor of en bane, 3 against), af'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4087
(U.S., Dec. 17, 1978). For what Judge Timbers described as "an unusually perceptive
criticism of the en banc procedure in Zahn," 480 F.2d at 304 n.3, see Second Circuit Note,
En Banc Petition-Decisive Presence of a Disqualified Judge, 47 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 345
(1972). For a summary of thirty cases in which the Second Circuit has granted en bane
hearings see Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 312 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1963).
17412 U.S. 945 (1978) (application for stay denied).
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has been stayed by Judge Timbers pending yet another appeal to the
Second Circuit.'
While the language of the Expediting Act deprives the courts of
appeals of jurisdiction to review final judgments in civil antitrust suits
brought by the Government, the Act is silent as to interlocutory ap-
peals. Since the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in United States v.
California Cooperative Canneries9 in 1929, the Act has been held to
"preclud[e] the possibility of an appeal to either court from an inter-
locutory decree."20 Thus the only appeal that would lie is to the Su-
preme Court and then only from a final judgment. 20a The panel
majority attempted to circumvent the holding of California Canneries
by interpreting the discovery order as a "final order."21 The founda-
tion for this approach was laid in the Supreme Court's decision in
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.22 The Cohen exception
expands the concept of "final judgments" to include a
small class [of interlocutory orders] which finally determine claims
of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the ac-
tion, too important to be denied review and too independent of the
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated. 28
Thus, the panel held that the discovery order satisfied the Cohen test
and was a final judgment for the purposes of appeal.24
18 170 N.Y.L.J. Aug. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 1 (district court contempt order). 170 N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 9, 1973, at 1, col. 4 (stay continued pending decision by court of appeals). As this
issue went to press, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's contempt order.
Nos. 73-2126-7, 73-2145-6 (2d Cir., Dec. 17, 1973).
19279 U.S. 558 (1929). In this case the district court had refused a petition for
intervention in an attempt to set aside a consent decree. The court of appeals, without
considering the question of its own jurisdiction, reversed the district court and directed
intervention. 299 F. 908 (1924). In reversing, the Supreme Court noted that the court of
appeals lacked jurisdiction and that its assumption of the matter was a departure "from
the limits of admissible discretion." 279 U.S. at 560.
20279 U.S. at 558.
20a 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970). See note I supra.
21471 F.2d at 512-16.
22337 U.S. 541 (1949). This was a stockholders derivative suit in federal court on the
ground of diversity of citizenship. The defendant corporation unsuccessfully moved in
the district court to have the plaintiff post $125,000 security for expenses and attorney's
fees pursuant to New Jersey law. 7 F.R.D. 352 (D.N.J. 1947). The court of appeals reversed
and ordered the security posted. 170 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1948). In affirming, the Supreme
Court relied on a "practical rather than a technical construction" of the statute to
avoid the "irreparable injury" which would result if the question of posting security
could not be decided until it would be moot. 337 U.S. at 546.
23 337 U.S. at 546.
24 471 F.2d at 514. One fallacy in the logic of this argument is that if the order can
be considered a "final judgment" then it should be appealable under the Expediting
Act. In that case it would fall into the exception of these cases "where direct review may
be had in the Supreme Court."
[Vol. 48:229
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While the Cohen exception may be a proper justification for an
interlocutory appeal in the ordinary case, it in no way aids appellate
jurisdiction in actions specifically governed by the Expediting Act.25
To overcome this remaining obstacle, the panel argued that the rule
which permits intermediate appeals in certain private party litigation
had been expanded by the Supreme Court in Shenandoah Valley Broad-
casting, Inc. v. ASCAP.23 Shenandoah permits appeals to the circuit
courts where the issue "is entirely between private parties and is out-
side the mainstream of the litigation in which the Government is
directly concerned."27 The panel sought to have this exception en-
compass appeals of ancillary matters even where the Government re-
mained a party to the action.28
The case which was claimed to mark the shift was a dismissal of
an appeal to the Supreme Court which simply cited the earlier rule
as authority.2 The en banc majority correctly noted that while the
Government remained a party to that action, it no longer considered
itself aggrieved and thus, unlike the present case, the dispute was actu-
ally between private parties.8 0
Thirteen days prior to the panel's ruling, the Supreme Court
gave detailed examination to the problem of interlocutory appeals in
cases under the Expediting Act. In Tidewater Oil Co. v. United
States,31 the district court had certified that the order involved a con-
trolling question of law,3 2 an ordinary procedure permitting an inter-
See Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972),
wherein a district court order permitted defendant franchisor conditional communication
with members of the class for which plaintiff was maintaining a class action. Plaintiff
sought to appeal this order, and defendant moved to dismiss for lack of appellate
jurisdiction. The court dismissed the appeal, finding that: (1) the order would not have
the drastic consequences of depriving the plaintiff of his "day in court"; (2) the appeal
would not settle the issue, but only raise further questions; and (3) the order was granted
only temporarily and in contemplation of further action. Chief Judge Friendly, speaking
for the court, indicated "that Cohen must be kept within narrow bounds, lest this excep-
tion swallow the salutory 'final judgment' rule." Id. at 773.
25 See note 1 supra; 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) which provides that: "The courts of
appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
of the United States ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
26 375 U.S. 39, modified, 375 U.S. 994 (1963). Shenandoah involved a suit under the
Sherman Act. The case was directly appealed to the Supreme Court which dismissed for
want of jurisdiction. The court of appeals subsequently found the Expediting Act
applicable and dismissed the appeal that had been brought to it. Holding that the order
had been final, yet not directly concerning the United States Government, the Supreme
Court on petition for writ of certiorari remanded the case to the court of appeals.
27 375 US. at 40-41.
28 471 F.2d at 514.
29 Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. United States, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
30 480 F.2d at 297.
31409 U.S. 151 (1972).
32 409 U.S. at 152. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
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locutory appeal. While expressing great dissatisfaction with the Act"'
itself, the Court felt that
personal views as to the wisdom of § 2 are, of course, no basis for
disregarding what we are bound to recognize as the plain and un-
altered intent of Congress to require that appeals in Government
civil antitrust cases be taken only from final judgments and only
to this Court.34
The panel attempted to distinguish Tidewater on the grounds
that it was an appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss a party,
which is an issue of antitrust significance and part of the main action,
whereas the discovery order in IBM was an ancillary matter and sub-
sidiary to the central controversy.3 5 The en banc majority did not view
Tidewater so narrowly. The Second Circuit reasoned that if jurisdic-
tion would not lie where the question had certified, a fortiori it would
not lie where the district court had refused a request to certify.3 6
As its second avenue of approach to jurisdiction, the panel relied
on the All Writs Act.37 A discovery order may be reviewable by writ
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appeal-
able under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such
order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal
to be taken from such order...
See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 351 (1971); Ross Trustees v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531 (1970). In Standard Oil the state was attempting to bring a parens patriae claim
and a class action under the Clayton Act. The district court dismissed the parens patriae
count, but denied the motion to dismiss the class action. Because the law was unsettled
on this point, the court granted a section 1292(b) certification. 405 U.S. at 256. In Ross,
the district court held that a shareholder had a right to a jury trial in any suit in which
the corporation would have had the same right had it been suing. Interlocutory appeal
was granted because the Court found "substantial grounds for difference of opinion as
to this question ... an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termina-
tion of this litigation." 396 U.S. at 532.
33 The Court noted in this regard:
[W]e remain convinced that under present circumstances the Expediting Act
fails to hasten substantially the final disposition of important antitrust actions
while it unjustifiably burdens this Court with inadequately sifted records and
with cases that could be disposed of by review in the courts of appeals. Uniform-
ity in the interpretation and administration of the antitrust laws continues to be
an important consideration. But such uniformity could be adequately ensured
by the availability of review in this Court on certiorari of cases involving issues
of general importance - together with the '[1]imited expediting of such cases,
under the discretion of this Court,'.. .where time is a factor. The simple fact is
that 'ft he legal issues in most [Government] civil antitrust cases are no longer
so nove or unsettled as to make them especially appropriate for initial appellate
consideration by this Court, as compared with those in a variety of other areas of
federal law.'
409 U.S. at 170 (dtations omitted).
34 Id.
s 471 F.2d at 514-15.
36 480 F.2d at 296.
87471 F.2d at 516-17. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970) provides: "The Supreme Court and
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of mandamus under the criteria set forth in American Express Ware-
housing Ltd. v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 8 where there is a "usurpa-
tion of power," dear abuse of discretion, and the presence of an issue
of first impression. 9 The issuance of the IBM discovery order, it was
argued, met this tripart test thus permitting the court to exercise juris-
diction notwithstanding the Expediting Act.4° While the issue has never
been squarely decided, Supreme Court dicta indicates that such a route
may not be taken. The Court has noted that, where "the statutory
scheme permits appellate review of interlocutory orders only on appeal
from the final judgment, review by certiorari or other extraordinary
writ is not permissible .... "41
Consistent with its earlier dicta, the Supreme Court denied an
application for a stay of the district court's order following the en banc
decision.4 Undaunted by its lack of success, IBM considered the issue
of the privileged documents far from settled. IBM attempted to follow
much of the battle plan set forth in Judge Moore's en banc dissent:
The custodian of the 1,200 allegedly privileged papers in the instant
case disregards (with or without advice of counsel) the court order
to produce. A contempt order of commitment then ensues. The
jail door closes. The Supreme Court has said that it will review
only the final judgment so that it can pass upon important ques-
tions of antitrust law. But the order of incarceration has nothing
to do with antitrust law. It is entirely ancillary or collateral to the
"mainstream" of the antitrust litigations. The victim has no par-
ticular interest in the refinements of that field of the law. All that
he desires is some court to which he can appeal the unlawfulness of
all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
8 380 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1967).
39 Id. at 283. The test is based on Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). It is
interesting to note that in American Express, a non-Expediting Act case, the petitioner
was appealing an order directing him to turn over matter claimed to fall within the
attorney's work product privilege. The court set down the test for a writ of mandamus
permitting interlocutory review but held that it was not met under the facts of the case.
It also expressed the view that Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Corp. could not be used to
appeal discovery orders. 380 F.2d at 280.
4o The panel found the "dear abuse of discretion"
finsofar as (1) the Edelstein order is in direct conflict with the provisions of the
Neville order, (2) the Edelstein order is based on the erroneous assumption that
waiver occurred by IBM delivery to CDC, and (3) the Edelstein order has ignored
the intent of the IBM-Government agreement....
471 F.2d at 517.
41 United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 203 (1945). It
should be noted that the Court did grant a writ of certiorari in that case because of a
conflict betveen the district court's jurisdiction and that of a federal agency. However, the
Alkali Export dicta was cited with approval in Tidewater. 409 U.S. at 161 n.25.
42412 US. 945 (1973). The application was made to Mr. Justice Marshall and was
submitted by him to the Court. Mr. Justice Douglas would have granted the stay.
19731
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his confinement. I seriously doubt that the Supreme Court would
interpret its recent decisions in Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States
... requiring the contemnor to languish in jail for five or more
years with the dubiously cheerful knowledge that due process of law
eventually would be accorded him when the antitrust appeal would
be finally decided.4 3
However, the district court was not so accommodating. Rather
than holding IBM in criminal contempt which would have established
a basis for appellate review of the discovery order, it found the con-
temptuous conduct to be of a civil nature. 44 The distinction between
the two is in the nature and purpose of the remedy- whether it be
to punish and vindicate the authority of the court and hence, criminal;
or to secure compliance with the order of the court and thus, civil.46
Furthermore, the district court rejected IBM's request to have its
attorneys cited for contempt, thereby eliminating the possibility of
a non-party obtaining review of the validity of the contempt citation.48
43 480 F.2d at 301, 302 (Moore, J., dissenting). Judge Timbers also dissented in a
separate opinion. Id. at 303.
44 170 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 4. A citation for criminal contempt is con-
sidered final and thus immediately appealable whether a party or non-party is cited.
Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107 (1922); Hanley v. James McHugh Constr. Co.,
419 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1969); Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968); Duell
v. Duell, 178 F.2d 683, 687-88 (D.D.C. 1949). However, a civil contempt order is considered
interlocutory and is appealable only from the final judgment. Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S.
105 (1956); Dickinson v. Rinke, 132 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1943).
See Vincent v. Teamsters Local 294, 424 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1970), wherein the Second
Circuit recognized the general rule of non-review of civil contempt orders until final
judgment, but noted that where a contempt order is issued after the principal action
has concluded, it is immediately reviewable. The court went on to hold that since the
contempt order was made pursuant to an injunction which had since expired, the appeal
was moot.
45 See Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442-43 (1911). In McCrone
v. United States, 507 U.S. 61 (1938), the Court observed:
While particular acts do not always lend themselves to classification as civil
or criminal contempts, a contempt is considered civil when the punishment is
wholly remedial, serves only the purpose of the complainant and is not intended
as a deterrent to offenses against the public.
Id. at 64 (footnote omitted). United States v. Ross, 243 F. Supp. 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
The intended effect of a civil contempt order is to insure compliance. McComb v.
Jacksonville Paper Co., 536 U.S. 187, 191 (1949). Criminal contempt is punitive in nature
and seeks to vindicate the authority of the court. United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947).
46 Good faith reliance upon the advice of counsel may be a defense to a criminal
contempt but not to a civil citation. In re Eskay, 123 F.2d 819 n.17 (3d Cir. 1941). See
United States v. Goldfarb, 167 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1948). A judgment of civil contempt
would have provided a basis for an appeal even though the main action was still pending.
McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324
(1904); Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968).
IBM in its attempt to have its attorneys cited for contempt relied upon Appeal of
the SEC, 236 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955). There, SEC general counsel, now Judge William
H. Timbers, was ordered held in custody for failure of the SEC to turn over subpoenaed
documents. As Chief Judge Edelstein properly noted, there was no other meaningful
way to insure compliance with that order; furthermore, attorney Timbers had been
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1972 TERM
The remaining vehicle for reconsideration of the discovery order
was through a hearing pursuant to local civil rule 14(b) which permits
the contemnor to place both the alleged misconduct and the resulting
damages in issue.47 The district court distinguished between a fine
necessary to insure compliance and the damages to be awarded to the
plaintiff Government for the delay; it postponed the issue of damages
but held that based on IBM's annual report, a $150,000 a day fine
would be appropriate. Most critical of all, the court refused to grant a
hearing on issue of the alleged misconduct on the ground that the facts
necessary for a determination of contempt had been admitted and,
therefore, a hearing would only serve "the purposes of delay and ob-
fuscation." 4
Underlying the contempt question were the competing policy
considerations of the virtues of speedy determinations in Expediting
Act cases versus the potential waste of judicial resources in permitting
a complex antitrust matter to reach a final conclusion only to be
reversed on the basis of a pretrial order erroneously given. The
philosophy expressed by Chief Judge Edelstein seemed to reject con-
sideration of either:
[1I]t is not proper for the district court to enter an order which is
designed to either thwart or promote an interlocutory appeal....
The district court can, and should, do no more than frame an order
which it believes to be proper in the circumstances of the case be-
fore it.49
While such a viewpoint may at times be more easily expressed than
followed, it does reflect an unwillingness to set aside the mandate of
the Expediting Act whenever a party determines that reversal of an
interlocutory order is critical to its case. Presumably, the Act contem-
plated postponement until final judgment not merely of frivolous
appeals but also those of substance and merit.
sworn as a witness and was, therefore, under the technical jurisdiction of the court.
170 N.Y.LJ., Aug. 2, 1973, at 5, col. 4. The order upon which the contempt was based
was later reversed. 403 F.2d 119.
47 So. & E. DIST. R. 14(b) (McKinney's N.Y. Court Rules 1973), provides:
If the alleged contemnor puts in issue his alleged misconduct or the damages
thereby occasioned, he shall upon demand therefor, be entitled to have oral
evidence taken thereon, either before the court or before a master appointed by
the court. When by law such . . . contemnor is entitled to a trial by jury, he
shall make a written demand therefor ... otherwise he will be deemed to have
waived a trial by jury.
The Supreme Court has ruled that in fixing a fine for civil contempt the court must
"consider the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by the continued con-
tumacy and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the
result desired." United States v. United Mine Workers, 30 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947).
48 170 N.Y.LJ., Aug. 2, 1973, at 5. col. 3.
48 Id. at col. 4.
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While IBM's tripart attempt to circumvent the Expediting Act
by appeal, writ, and contempt ultimately proved unsuccessful, it
raises serious questions concerning our entire structure of appellate
jurisdiction. Criticism of the Act has come from all quarters.50 Over-
load of the Supreme Court's calendar, 1 lack of benefit of the inter-
mediate court's opinion,52 and possible prejudice to a party in waiting
until final judgment is rendered 53 have all been cited as resulting evils.
The unspoken issue presented in the IBM cases is whether judicial
construction is the proper mode for correcting the defects of the Ex-
pediting Act.
A piecemeal approach to expanding the jurisdiction of the courts
of appeals would provide little or no relief for the Supreme Court's
calendar. If intermediate review of interlocutory matters were per-
mitted, as the panel has suggested, the number of cases reviewable on
direct appeal to the Supreme Court would remain the same as would
the number of issues open for review; furthermore, there would be a
corresponding increase in petitions for certiorari following the courts
of appeals decisions . 4 Since expedition of these cases is a legitimate and
proper interest, provisions would have to be made to keep the addi-
tional time required for intermediate review down to a minimum.55
Seventy years ago, Congress passed the Expediting Act as a pro-
cedural measure to insure the speedy determination of important
controversies of public interest in what was then a new area of the law.
Today, Congress, together with the judiciary, should reexamine the
entire structure of jurisdiction in light of the changing needs and
priorities of our judicial system. While the Expediting Act is a prime
candidate for reform, a careful look with an eye toward overall plan-
ning is more likely to bring about more satisfactory results than judi-
cial construction to meet the needs of a particular controversy.
50 See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.1 (1963) (Clark, J.);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364-65 (1962) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See also Gissell, A Much Needed Reform in the Expediting Act for Antitrust Cases, 1961
N.Y. A'rrRmusTr L. Syr. 98 (Expediting Act is outdated; there are no questions of law
to decide in antitrust litigation). But see Celler, Case in Support of Application of the
Expediting Act to Antitrust Suit, 14 DEPAVL L. REV. 29 (1964) (new issues arising in
antitrust law, and uniform interpretation, policies, and enforcement is to be preferred);
Solomon, Repeal of the Expediting Act-A Negative View, 1961 N.Y. AmrRusr L. Sym.
94 (avoidance of delay and appeal as of right are valuable features of the Expediting Act).
51 Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 169 (1972). For a strong case that
the Supreme Court's calendar is not as overloaded as one might be led to believe see the
dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas at id. at 174.
52409 U.S. 169.
58 480 F.2d at 302.
54409 US. at 171.
55 United States v. Cities Serv. Co., 410 F.2d 662, 670 (Ist Cir. 1969).
